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s early as the Greek tragedians we find the idea of what is generally called 'natural
law'. This is the idea that there are moral laws which, just simply, are eternally and universally
true, and which supersede the positive laws or ethical customs of particular societies. The
natural law is 'written upon men's hearts'. Our highest moral duty is to obey the natural law.
Important classical thinkers reckoned in this tradition are Aristotle, Cicero, Gratian, Aquinas,
Suárez, Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke. This idea underlies the notion of 'inalienable rights' in
the American Declaration of Independence, and it is the foundation of most current Roman
Catholic moral thinking.
Whatever good this idea has done, over the ages, as a regulating principle for moral or legal
reform, it has also had a more dubious side. It was part of the network of ideas that
constrained the lending of money in the middle ages (and so intensified the marginalization of
Jews); it has been used to justify forms of slavery; it lies at the root of instinctive homophobia;
it underlies the knee-jerk enthusiasm for free-market capitalism….
Nature, as a regulating principle, can be highly tyrannical.

Now Aristotle is, par excellence, the West's philosopher of nature. But I think it is a mistake to
include him in this lineage of promoters of natural law theory.
In his careful treatment of natural law, in the Nicomachean Ethics, he makes the surprising
claim that natural justice is changeable. Commentators have bust a gut in trying to explain
what he might mean by this, and their answers are as unconvincing as they are various.
Looking closely at those texts, however, we see that he likens a change in natural law to the
development, through exercise, of ambidexterity. "By nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is
possible that all men should become ambidextrous." This simile has not been thought through.

If we take it seriously, however, then Aristotle is claiming, surprisingly, that humans can
improve on the deep moral proclivities with which they are naturally (sc.'normally') endowed.
We may all be naturally inclined to admire patriotism, to hate inconstancy, and to prize
reputation, but such natural, deep moral beliefs can perhaps be improved upon. Aristotle is not
a natural law theorist: he shares with that company the idea that certain deep moral
inclinations are 'written upon our hearts', but he does not share the view that these natural
moral inclinations are, ethically, the bottom line. He does not succumb to their tyranny. He
does not belong in the list of natural law theorists, and, most certainly, he does not figure at
the head of that list.
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